Abstract-In this work, a scheme for key distribution and network access in a Wireless Sensor Network (WSN) that utilizes IdentityBased Cryptography (IBC) is presented. The scheme is analyzed on the ARM920T processor and measurements were taken for the runtime and energy of its components. It was found that the Tate pairing component of the scheme consumes significant amounts of energy, and so should be ported to hardware. An accelerator was implemented in 65 nm Complementary Metal Oxide Silicon (CMOS) technology and area, timing, and energy figures have been obtained for the design. Results indicate that a hardware implementation of IBC would meet the strict energy constraint required of a wireless sensor network node.
contaminant. Given the sensitive nature of such sensing and potential repercussions associated with it, security is extremely important in this application. This is the target scenario for this paper. The assumptions made are that the network is static, the batteries of the devices cannot be replaced, and that the nodes are not protected by tamperproof hardware. It is also assumed that the devices that make up the network are homogeneous and have the ability to determine their position by running a localization algorithm [5] .
We believe that a symmetric key cryptosystem is appropriate for communication between the nodes, though a preinstalled systemwide symmetric key or pairwise keys stored on the devices are not suitable for reasons of security and lack of memory, respectively. Therefore, an asymmetric or public key system is required to establish the symmetric keys between individual nodes.
With a traditional approach, if node A wants to communicate with node B, it first has to receive B's digital certificate before it can send a message. When the two nodes are in direct radio communication this will mean one transmission from B to A. In the case of B being out of range of A, the digital certificate would have to be relayed to A via intermediate nodes. As the radio is likely to be the main consumer of energy in the node, it is important to minimize the number of transmissions. This can be achieved using IBC [6] in which there is no need for a certificate to bind a node's identity to its public key, as the node's identity can be used as the public key.
There is a lot of related work that use IBC in the context of WSNs [7] , [8] , [9] , [10] , [11] , [12] . Doyle et al. proposed the use of IBC for security in WSN [7] . They profiled the energy required to run the Tate pairing on a 32-bit processor for a curve over GF ð2 107 Þ and arrived at a figure of 0.44 J. This work was carried out using simulation on a curve that would not be considered secure due to the small field size.
Cheng et al. [8] present an IBC scheme based on the work of Boneh and Franklin [13] . They do not propose the use of a symmetric key cryptosystem for WSN and hence are using their IBC scheme for encrypting data. The Tate pairing will only be required to be calculated once for a pair of nodes and can be cached for future use in encryption and decryption. They do not investigate the energy usage of their scheme.
Oliveira et al. [9] present an implementation of the Tate pairing on a 8-bit ATmega128L microcontroller used in the Mica devices [14] . The time taken for the Tate pairing calculation is 5:5 s. They detail a scheme for key establishment based on Identity-Based Noninteractive Key Distribution Scheme (ID-NIKDS).
Szczechowiak et al. [10] present a ID-NIKDS scheme and also profile the Tate pairing on a range of different wireless sensor nodes including the Imote2 [15] . Their fastest implementation of the Tate pairing is 0:06 s and it consumes 3:76 mJ of energy. They present a scheme that defends against node capture if most of the nodes only have the capability to act as a data source.
The scheme proposed by Kim et al. [11] is based on devices being present in the network that can act as security managers. These security managers perform the expensive Tate pairing calculation and the stated advantage of this system is that the low-power nodes do not have to perform this task. As the WSN envisaged in this work is made up of homogeneous nodes then every device would have to perform the role of security manager, if key establishment within the network is to be achieved. Therefore, this scheme would not be an improvement over one based on ID-NIKDS.
Zhang et al.'s approach is similar to the one pursued in this work, in that it also uses location in its security mechanisms [12] . The security of their system is based on the fact that a network master secret, that is used to generate location-based keys, is kept secret for a minimum time. This is the time that it is believed that an adversary would require to access this key if in control of the node. When the nodes have all calculated their location-based keys then this network master secret is securely erased. Additional devices added to the network will require access to this network master secret. This scheme's security depends upon keeping this network master secret secure.
It has been identified by previous work that IBC can provide a mechanism for authenticated key agreement in a WSN. This work follows this approach and also proposes a technique that could be used to improve the resistance of the WSN to node capture by maintaining a list of authenticated devices in radio range. A method for adding nodes to the network and removing them from the WSN is outlined. A low-energy Tate pairing accelerator is implemented and this, to the best of our knowledge, is the first attempt at designing an accelerator for minimizing the energy of the pairing.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: the Tate pairing, a key component of IBC, and methods for calculating it, are discussed in Section 2. In Section 3, the suitability of different methods of key distribution for application in WSNs are discussed. IBC is proposed as the most suitable candidate for secure distribution of keys in the network. A scheme for implementing key distribution and network access in a WSN is described in Section 4. How the scheme performs against well-known attack is presented in Section 5. A software implementation of the scheme is profiled in Section 6. In Section 7, the Galois field arithmetic units that make up the Tate pairing are discussed and implemented in hardware. Timing and energy figures for the various units are also presented. The overall architecture for the Tate pairing accelerator is presented in Section 8. The timing and energy figures are compared against previous implementations and software. Finally, a discussion of the results and conclusions drawn are presented in Sections 9 and 10.
MATHEMATICAL BACKGROUND
This work is concerned with applying IBC to solving the key distribution problem in WSNs. In order to aid understanding of later sections, a brief mathematical summary of the area is presented in this section. Further introductory material on Elliptic Curve Cryptography can be found in [16] .
Tate Pairing
The identity-based cryptosystems discussed later in this thesis are based on the hardness of the Bilinear Diffie Hellman Problem (BDHP).
Definition 2.1 (Bilinear Diffie Hellman Problem). Given P ; aP ; bP ; cP 2 EðGF ð2 m ÞÞ it is computationally infeasible to calculate e l ðP ; P Þ abc 2 GF ð2 mk Þ, where EðGF ð2 m ÞÞ is a supersingular elliptic curve defined on the Galois field GF ð2 m Þ and e l ðP ; P Þ is an application of the Tate pairing.
If l j #EðGF ð2
m ÞÞ where l is a large prime l, and k is the smallest integer such that l j ð2 mk À 1Þ then the Tate pairing is defined as [17] of the output of the pairing provides a unique value rather than a member of an equivalence class. The integer k is known as the security multiplier and is four for the particular curve considered in this paper.
The Tate pairing essentially takes two points on an elliptic curve and maps them to a element of a multiplicative group of a large finite extension field. The choice of the elliptic curve group over which the Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem (ECDLP) is posed must be such that it requires at least 2 80 operations to solve. Therefore, l has to be at least of the order of %2 160 . Also, the finite field to which the Tate pairing maps must be sufficiently large to make the Discrete Logarithm Problem (DLP) intractable, i.e., it has a running time of 2 80 . For a binary field, as used in this paper, it has to be of the order of 2 1;024 . As k ¼ 4 for the curve used in this paper, this means that m must be at least 250.
Algorithm
Based upon the work of Duursma and Lee [19] , a closed form of the Tate pairing calculation, which is known as the algorithm, has been obtained for characteristic two [20] , [21] . The Tate pairing is given by
where
and l 2 i P is the equation of the tangent to the curve at the point 2 i P . Through application of the distortion map, , and a lot of algebraic manipulation (7) is arrived at and this is rewritten in the form of Algorithm 1.
where s; t 2 GF ð2 283Â4 Þ. This algorithm requires seven multiplications in the field GF ð2 m Þ. It has a regular structure that maps well to hardware, and it is the Tate pairing algorithm that is implemented in this work.
SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS IN A WSN
There is a clear need for security in a WSN. The main requirements, known as confidentiality and network access, respectively, are that the data exchanged in the network should not be read by an unauthorized third party and also that this third party cannot join the network. The unique challenges of WSNs is that the nodes have limited energy and radio communication range, there is no device that can act as a trusted server and their topology is not known before deployment. The lack of a trusted server being present in the network means that there are only three approaches to distribute symmetric keys; standard public key schemes, IBC, or key predistribution. Standard public keys schemes are not an appropriate choice due to the extra communication overhead of sending digital certificates as compared to the solution offered by IBC. There are a number of different key predistribution schemes and these are discussed below.
The simplest approach to deploy a symmetric system would be that all the nodes share the same key. As the nodes could be placed in a region where an adversary can capture them, it is likely that it could extract the secret key, and therefore would be able to monitor all communication in the network. For this reason, this method of ensuring privacy is not appropriate in a hostile environment.
Another method would be for all the nodes to set up pairwise keys between them before deployment. If there are n nodes in the network then each node would have to store n À 1 keys in its persistent memory. In a resourceconstrained device this would be a problem as the size of the network would be determined by the memory available. The other main drawback to using this scheme is that it does not scale. If, after deploying the bulk of the nodes, it is required to add extra nodes then this is not possible unless the extra nodes' keys are already programmed in the deployed network. Upon capture of a node, however, only its n À 1 links will be compromised, which is a improvement on the system that uses only one symmetric key.
Eschenauer and Gligor developed a key distribution technique based on probabilistic key sharing [22] . In this approach, a large pool of keys is generated from which a smaller ring of keys is randomly selected and preloaded before deployment onto each node. Each node thus has a separate ring of keys in which there may be a shared key. During the shared key discovery phase of the algorithm, neighboring nodes ascertain whether they share a key. If there is no path between nodes in radio range there is a further path-key establishment phase which make use of the already secure links to distribute pairwise key. It has been shown that in order to create a network of 10;000 nodes the pool of keys has to be 100;000 and the key ring only has to be 250 [22] . This system is scalable as when a new node is added to network it only has to be preloaded with a random selection of 250 keys from the key pool. However, this scheme is not secure against capture by an adversary. The security of the probabilistic key sharing approach has been improved by Chan et al. [23] who proposed that nodes need to have q common keys. Probabilistic key sharing could impose a large transmission overhead upon nodes during the initial setup phase when path-keys are being established, and, due to its probabilistic nature, it might not generate a complete network when the nodes are sparsely dispersed.
Chan et al. also propose the random pairwise scheme where they observed that a node does not need to store n À 1 keys in order to establish a network [23] . Instead, it must store np keys where n is the size of the network and p is the probability of any two nodes being connected such that a complete network is established. In the initialization phase of this scheme, m distinct pairwise keys are placed on the nodes. Upon deployment, the nodes broadcast their IDs so that nodes in communication range can ascertain whether they share a common key. This scheme suffers from one of the drawbacks of the naive pairwise scheme as it is not scalable.
Blundo et al. present a scheme for distributing conference keys that could be used in WSN [24] . In this scheme, a secret symmetric bivariate polynomial, fðx 1 ; x 2 Þ, of degree k with coefficients in GF ðqÞ is selected by the programming entity. Each node will be programmed with a unique identity and this identity, i 2 GF ðqÞ, is input to the polynomial giving fði; x 2 Þ, which is then stored on the node. If two nodes wish to establish a pairwise key they insert the identity of the device that they are communicating with into this polynomial share. Each device will need to store a polynomial which occupies ðk þ 1Þlog 2 q bits of memory, thus potentially making the memory a limiting factor on the size of the network. This scheme is only secure as long as less the k nodes are compromised.
The symmetric key distribution scheme of Blom could be applied to a WSN [25] . A k Â n generator matrix, G, with elements from GF ðqÞ is selected, where n is the number of nodes in the network. The secret k Â k matrix, D, over GF ðqÞ is generated and is multiplied with G to give S ¼ ðDGÞ T . Each node is assigned the ith row of S and ith column of G. If two nodes now want to establish a shared key they exchange their columns (i; j) in G and perform matrix multiplication with the stored row of S resulting in an element of the matrix K ¼ ðDGÞ T G. A shared key is generated as K is a symmetric matrix and therefore K ij ¼ K ji . This scheme is only secure as long as k rows of S remain secret. As with the previous scheme there is a requirement for the node to store a large amount of keying material which in this case is ðk þ 1Þlog 2 q bits. Lui et al. propose a technique that combines the work of Blundo et al. with that of Eschenauer et al. [26] . Instead of a ring of keys on each node, a number of polynomial shares of different bivariate symmetric polynomials are placed on the devices. The nodes need to know what polynomial shares are on adjacent devices in the network and techniques for achieving this are outlined in the paper. Unlike the basic probabilistic key sharing scheme, each pair of nodes will have a unique key. But it is still a probabilistic technique with the same problems as outlined above. A similar scheme based on the work of Blom et al. is presented by Du et al. [27] .
In comparison with other schemes, IBC provides an simple, scalable and secure, against individual node capture, method of distributing symmetric keys. SOK ID-NIKDS was proposed by Sakai et al. [28] 
Thus, the memory requirement of this scheme is better than the other key predistribution schemes as only the identity of the node with which it will communicate is required. Key authentication is also assured as only the KGC and a single node will have a copy of the private key. A major drawback of using this approach is that an adversary could be able to extract the keying material from a node and generate a pairwise key with any node in the network. Therefore, key distribution has to be combined with network access control to prevent this happening, as outlined in the next section.
SCHEME
The scheme outlined here, for implementing key distribution and network access control in a WSN, is designed for a static network, and uses SOK ID-NIKDS and BMLQ Identity-Based Signature (IBS) [29] . Environmental pollution monitoring is the target application. In this case, the nodes that are detecting the pollution, such as chemical reagents have a fixed position that they determine by running a localization algorithm. End users have to be able to easily extract data from the network and this can be achieved using a Personal Digital Assistant (PDA)-type device. The scheme uses ID-NIKDS and IBS as a method for distributing symmetric keys, and also to allow devices access to the WSN. We assume that the nodes themselves are not protected by tamper-resistant hardware as this would increase their cost. Therefore, it is possible that data and keying material on the devices can be extracted. Also, the KGC, which programs the devices, and the PDAs, which extract information from the WSN, are secure. The end users of the WSN would be able to find out if a PDA is lost and hence exclude that particular device from the WSN. Communication between the KGC and the network could be achieved remotely by using the extracting device, such as a PDA, as a proxy. Before the extracting device communicates with the WSN, it could be programmed by the KGC with messages that it wishes to broadcast to the network.
There are five distinct stages to this scheme; prior to deployment, deployment, node addition, node removal, and data extraction. Each one of these stages are outlined below.
Prior to Deployment
This part of the scheme is concerned with distributing the domain parameters and private keys to the nodes. The elliptic curve and Galois fields being used are hard coded on the device. For SOK ID-NIKDS, the devices have to be able to calculate K AB ¼ e l ðsQ A ; h 1 ðBÞÞ. For BLMQ IBS, they have to be able to generate a signature, S, and verify a signature, V . Therefore, among the parameters that are placed on the devices are
. ðQ P UB ¼ sQ; g ¼ e l ðP ; QÞÞ ! N X , and . ðQ KGC ; Q X ; sQ X Þ ! N X , where a generic node is given the identity N X and has public key Q X ¼ h 1 ðN X Þ and private key sQ X . Q KGC is the public key of the KGC. Instead of placing h 1 on the device, the hash function is carried out by the programming device and the point on the curve to which an identity equates is placed on the node. For the rest of this section, Q Ã represents the identity of the node and also its public key.
Deployment
During this phase, symmetric keys are set up between neighboring nodes in a pairwise fashion. The nodes would transmit a small signed message to every device in radio range at time T 1 . This would mean that devices that can generate a valid signature are permitted to join the network. They would then generate a pairwise symmetric key, K AB . The nodes maintain a list of authenticated devices in radio range.
. Q A ! Q B : mkSðmÞ, . Q B : V ðmkSðmÞÞ, . Q B : K AB ¼ e l ðQ A ; sQ B Þ, and . Maintain list of nodes in radio range, i.e., C B ¼ fQ A ; Q C ; Q D g, where K AB is a shared symmetric key between Q A and Q B ; S represents signing and V represents verification.
Wireless Sensor Node Addition
At time T 3 , extra devices may be added to the WSN. At a previous time, T 2 , the KGC will broadcast though the network the identity of the nodes to be added, e.g., E KGC ¼ fQ O ; Q P g. The identities of these devices, along with a time stamp, are signed by the KGC. It does this in order to authenticate these identities and prevent the message, requesting the addition of these identities, being replayed by an adversary in the future.
. Q P ! Q X : mkSðmÞ, . Q X : V ðmkSðmÞÞ, . Q X : K XP ¼ e l ðsQ X ; Q P Þ, and . Q X : If Q P 6 2 E KGC then reject Q P else Q P 2 C X .
Wireless Sensor Node Removal
A node's membership of the WSN can be revoked by the following process. At time T 2 , the KGC will broadcast the identity of the nodes to be removed, i.e., E KGC ¼ fQ O ; Q P g. The identities of these devices, along with a time stamp, are signed by the KGC in order to prevent a replay of the message.
Data Extraction
In the environmental monitoring scenario, it is envisaged that the WSN itself would be static, but that the entities extracting data from the network are mobile. For example, they could be a member of the Environmental Protection Agency who uses a PDA to extract information from the network. The PDA in this case will be programmed with the same domain parameters as the nodes. Only nodes authorized by the KGC can join the network; hence, the KGC needs to send a packet that contains the identity of Q P DA and is signed by its private key.
. Q KGC ! Q X : Q P DA kSðQ P DA Þ, . Q X : V ðQ P DA kSðQ P DA ÞÞ, and . Q X : K XP DA ¼ e l ðsQ X ; Q P DA Þ. When a PDA requests a reading, from a certain geographical area, it will diffuse this request through the network. As its identity Q P DA has already been broadcast to the network as a valid identity, then the node Q X sends data back to the PDA using Advanced Encryption Standard (AES). This message is encrypted by the pairwise symmetric key (K XP DA ) and forwarded toward the extraction point, which is also known as a sink. The encrypted message is also appended with a Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code (HMAC) generated using the local symmetric pairwise key ðK AX Þ and sent to Q A , which is along the path to Q P DA . Q A checks the HMAC and, if it is authentic, will generate a new HMAC using the key K AB and forward the message to Q B . This process continues until the message arrives at the PDA, thus ensuring that only devices that are members of the WSN can forward the message. It is possible that nodes on the path to the sink are compromised and could drop packets. This could be dealt with at the routing algorithm level (there could be multiple paths to the sink). A compromised node will not be able to decrypt the message as they do not have the pairwise key (K XP DA ) between the source and the sink.
SECURITY OF THE SCHEME
Various different attacks on a WSN are discussed in the following section.
Erroneous Data Insertion
A compromised or malfunctioning node may introduce erroneous data into the network and this scheme does not protect against this attack. Instead it is envisaged that the end user of the WSN will have software that will ignore data from a node that is not collaborated by other nodes in the same location.
Sinkhole Attack
In a sinkhole attack, a compromised device advertises a highquality route to a data extraction point, when it is not near one. This causes data to be routed to this malicious node, which can then drop the packets. As the nodes are aware of their position, this attack can be easily countered. If the device injects false routing information, to say that it is close to a distant area of the network, then as the nodes in the next hop are aware of their own position they will know that this could not be the case, and drop the packet. Also, if routing information is replayed from another section of the network then the receiving device will ignore the communication as the device from which the routing information originally is not a member of C X , where X is the node's identity.
Wormhole Attack
The wormhole attack [30] is where two devices, that are not nodes, and are geographically distant, conspire with each other to provide a low latency, undetectable (to the other devices in the WSN) route between them that is known as a wormhole. All communication between the source and sink would go through this wormhole as it appears to be a short path to the sink. The adversary could exploit this traffic to drop packets. The scheme defends against this attack as a node will only accept messages from a list of devices, C X , that it is authorized to communicate with.
Sybil Attack
Sybil attacks [31] can be mounted by compromised devices. In this attack, the nodes present multiple identities to neighboring devices in order to disrupt routing or provide multiple readings to the network to make the local aggregated data value erroneous. Under the scheme presented, this attack is no longer feasible, as during normal operation the nodes only accept packets from their neighbors in C X . During the node addition phase, they will only accept communication from devices in E KGC .
Identity Replication Attack
Unlike the Sybil attack, the identity replication attack [32] is based upon giving the same identity to different physical devices. This attack can be mounted because in a WSN there is no way to know that a node is compromised. If this device is cloned and placed in different parts of the network with the intention of disrupting the routing schemes then this attack can be overcome with the security scheme, since the nodes are only allowed to communicate with other devices that are members of C X . Hence, if a compromised device is placed in another part of the network it would not be able to join the WSN at that point.
SOFTWARE PROFILE OF THE SCHEME
In order to evaluate whether a scheme based on SOK ID-NIKDS and BMLQ, IBS is an appropriate choice for a WSN, the most computationally demanding components are implemented in software using the Miracl library [33] . The components that are profiled are exponentiation in the field GF ð2 283Â4 Þ (power), elliptic curve point multiplication (mult), and the Tate pairing (tate). In Table 1 , the Tate pairing contribution to the total is counted twice as it is used in signature verification and symmetric key generation. The target device is the ARM920T [34] as a similar processor is used on the Imote2 device.
The code used to implement the scheme was compiled for the ARM using the ARM Development Suite (ADS) v1.2. As well as generating an executable that can be downloaded to the ARM using the JTAG inputs, it also gives timing figures for these executables.
The total energy dissipated is 35:4 mJ and the power consumed is 0:05 W at 140 MHz. The time required to run the scheme algorithm at 200 MHz is 444:5 ms. Due to the nature of the experimental setup, these figures are a lower bound of the energy dissipated by these component parts. The energy measurements should be taken at 200 MHz as this will be the clock speed of the final system. This could not be achieved as the fastest clock speed that the board on which the measurements are taken on can run at is 140 MHz. It can be seen that a software implementation requires too much energy and its latency is unacceptably large for implementation on a node, therefore, we believe that a hardware implementation of this scheme should be investigated.
From analysis of Table 1 , it is clear that the Tate pairing calculation is the most computationally demanding component of the scheme. It requires 14:1 mJ to run which is considerable when the total energy budget of the nodes is of the order of 1;000 J. A key design goal of nodes is that they operate on a low duty cycle and the fact that the Tate pairing takes 177:1 ms is counter to this goal. A hardware implementation of the Tate pairing is therefore merited, as it will reduce the time it requires and also the energy it dissipates.
The software implementation of the scheme was undertaken in order to investigate whether a software solution of the Tate pairing would suffice for a WSN application and, if not, to identify key components that should be ported to hardware. Recent results have shown that the software implementation could be improved upon and significantly lower figures for the latency and energy arrived at, though they also conclude that a hardware implementation of pairings would be beneficial [10] .
ARITHMETIC OPERATIONS
All operations that are used for the various algorithms in the hardware accelerator take place in binary extension fields; either GF ð2 283 Þ or GF ð2 283Â4 Þ. If the Tate pairing calculation is rewritten as in Algorithm 1, then the arithmetic operations that are required are addition, multiplication, and inversion in both fields. In addition, a circuit is required to perform the squaring and square root operations in GF ð2 283 Þ, and exponentiation in GF ð2 283Â4 Þ. For a design of this nature, there is no real-time constraint and so there cannot be a latency that has to be met. Power is not important to this design, what is critical is the amount of energy that the device consumes. As a Lithium battery has a energy density of 2;880 J=cm 3 , which translates into 90 W =cm 3 =year [35] , then this figure of 2;880 J could be used as an energy constraint. It has been discussed previously that the device must operate on a low duty cycle to conserve energy; this requires a circuit that completes its operation quickly. At the same time, the device should be as cheap as possible, and this would mean that the techniques of parallelism might not be appropriate as they will increase the area and hence the cost. Finally, when the circuit is operating it should consume as little energy as possible. These, sometimes conflicting, design goals of latency, area, and energy are combined into a single metric known as area*energy*time (AET) which will be used to evaluate the circuits outlined in this work.
In the subfield GF ð2Þ, addition is carried out using modulo two arithmetic, and hence can be performed in hardware using an XOR gate. Addition is equivalent to subtraction in GF ð2Þ. Also, multiplication is performed using an AND gate in hardware.
The polynomial basis representation is used for the elements of the two finite fields such that for 2 GF ð2 283 Þ ¼ AðxÞ ¼ a 282 x 282 þ a 281 x 281 þ Á Á Á þ a 0 ðmod fðxÞÞ;
An irreducible polynomial (11) is chosen
such that it has an odd exponent polynomial which means that the square root operation can be carried out in one clock cycle. The polynomial for generating GF ð2 283Â4 Þ is
and it is defined over GF ð2 283 Þ.
Addition
Addition in a binary extension field is trivial to implement in hardware. It is an array of XOR gates, one for every two bits of the operands that are to be added. Hence, for GF ð2 283 Þ 283 XOR gates are required, and for GF ð2 283Â4 Þ 1132 are required.
Multiplication in GF ð2
283 Þ WSNs will be deployed in practice only if the devices that make up the network are cheap. In terms of multiplication in GF ð2 283 Þ, a fast bit-parallel multiplier is approximately 300,000 gates in area. This would be prohibitive in terms of manufacturing cost for a wireless sensor node. Thus, a bitserial approach to designing the multiplier is warranted. There are two approaches to a bit-serial multiplier-an Most Significant Bit (MSB) first design or Least Significant Bit (LSB) first design [36] .
The MSB Multiplier
The MSB multiplier is based on the following observation: 
From Algorithm 2, it can be seen that this circuit will require at least 283 clock cycles to complete.
The LSB Multiplier
Another approach to bit-serial multiplication in GF ð2 283 Þ is to use an LSB multiplier. The LSB multiplier is based on the following observation: 
CðxÞ can be calculated using a shift and add algorithm where the first partial product is b 0 AðxÞ. BðxÞ is then shifted right one bit while at the same time AðxÞ is multiplied by x and reduced mod fðxÞ. It is added to the previous product if b 1 is equal to one. The algorithm will terminate when the value of the right shift register is equal to zero (see Algorithm 3). This is an early exit mechanism, as it could finish after one clock cycle or 283 clock cycles.
From an analysis of the algorithm, it can seen that the addition of right shift and linear feedback barrel shift registers can be used to improve the performance of the circuit. Two, three, four, or five consecutive zero bits are searched for, and the registers shifted accordingly. As there is a cost in terms of extra area for every extra bit searched for, it was decided that five would be the most bits considered. This is because the probability of five zeros is 1 32 and the probability of more than five zeros is low. The data path circuitry is shown in Fig. 1 .
Multiplication in GF ð2
283Â4 Þ
Multiplication of two elements
is required. As the multiplication circuitry will exist for GF ð2 283 Þ, it can be used to perform the multiplication for GF ð2 283Â4 Þ using Karatsuba and Ofman's algorithm [37] . This sharing of resources will lead to a decrease in the monetary cost of the system.
As the elements are represented using the polynomial basis (10) . Then, the multiplication is as follows:
By applying the Karatsuba algorithm, the resultant equation is
Using terms common to more than one equation, i.e., a 0 b 0 þ a 1 b 1 it can be seen that 12 additions are required in GF ð2 283 Þ. In total, 9 multiplications and 22 additions are required in GF ð2
283 Þ when the Karatsuba algorithm is employed.
The data path circuitry is shown in Fig. 2 . The data path width is 283 bits wide. In order to reduce dynamic energy dissipation, wires are held at a constant value when not in use. This is accomplished through the signals enadd10 and enadd12 (not shown), which gate the inputs and the combinational logic, respectively. The LSB multipliers clocks are to be gated with their "done" signals. This technique takes advantage of the early exit of the LSB multipliers due to their structure.
Squaring
The bit-serial multiplier described in Section 7.2 could be used for squaring, but as squaring is used 283 times in each loop and in the inversion circuitry, this is not the optimum choice. Instead, a bit-parallel squaring circuit has been implemented. For example, if given CðxÞ; AðxÞ 2 GF ð2 4 Þ then
This can be implemented with two XOR gates and a reordering of the inputs. With the aid of a C++ program this technique can be applied to elements from GF ð2 283 Þ. The resulting matrix can be converted into hardware using Very High Speed Integrated Circuit Hardware Description Language (VHDL).
Square Root Circuit
Using the techniques of Fong et al. [38] , it is possible to reduce the latency of the square root operation to one clock cycle. Given ffiffiffi ffi p ¼ where
and
All of the exponents in (19) are odd. Equation (18) can be further developed as below:
From (19), it can be seen that
ðmod gðxÞÞ:
In the case of 2 GF ð2 283 Þ,
and the exponents are taken from (11) . This can be implemented in hardware using XOR gates in one clock cycle.
Exponentiation
The only exponentiation that is required for the Tate pairing calculation is ¼ 2 283 where ; 2 GF ð2 283Â4 Þ. This is also known as the Frobenius map.
Using (10), the exponentiation is as follows:
ðmod pðxÞÞ:
For a proof, see [39] . The Frobenius map can therefore be implemented in hardware with two additions in GF ð2
283 Þ and reordering of the coefficients.
Inversion in GF ð2
283 Þ There are two well-known techniques for inversion of 2 GF ð2 283 Þ. One approach is based on Fermat's little theorem and the other uses the extended Euclidean algorithm.
Inversion by Fermat's Little Theorem
Fermat's little theorem (see (26) ) can be used to invert an element of GF ð2 283 Þ À2 is the inverse of . The inverse of can be calculated with the square and multiply technique using the following observations: 
This algorithm requires 282 squarings and 281 multiplications in GF ð2 283 Þ. From Sections 7.2 and 7.4, it can be seen that multiplication in GF ð2 283 Þ is a very expensive operation in terms of time and energy. It would be beneficial to reduce the number of multiplications. This can achieved using the techniques of Itoh and Tsujii [40] .
for a field GF ð2 n Þ then we can apply the following recursive formula to reduce the number of multiplications. When n is odd then
and when n is even
À1 can now be decomposed using (28) and (29) resulting in only 11 multiplications and 282 squarings are required to obtain the inverse of . The data path circuitry is shown in Fig. 3. 
Inversion by the Extended Euclidean Algorithm
The Extended Euclidean algorithm is implemented using Algorithm 4. The data path circuitry is shown in Fig. 4 . This block uses the degree subblock to measure the degree of the polynomials u and v.
Inversion in GF ð2
283Â4 Þ Fermat's little theorem (26) can also be used to get the inversion of an element 2 GF ð2 283Â4 Þ where the extension field of GF ð2 283 Þ is obtained using the irreducible polynomial given in (12) . The technique below, that has been used by Guajardo and Paar [41] , is used as it makes use of circuits that are already designed.
If the general case, 2 GF ð2 mk Þ is considered, then the inverse is À1 ¼
where r ¼ When working in the field GF ð2 283Â4 Þ the first stage of the inversion algorithm (5) is obtained by the following equations:
If we let
where ; 2 GF ð2 283Â4 Þ, this can be rewritten as 283Â4 Þ. The data path circuitry is shown in Fig. 5 . Table 2 presents the results of all the circuits that have been discussed in terms of their latency, energy, area, and AET metric. The operations are listed as follows; mult_lsb* is the LSB GF ð2 283 Þ multiplier, mult_msb is the MSB GF ð2 283 Þ multiplier, square is the squaring circuit, sqroot is the square root operation, mult_koa is the Karatsuba algorithm multiplier, inv_ferm is the GF ð2 283 Þ inverter, and inv_gf2m4 is the GF ð2 283Â4 Þ multiplier. The choice of the GF ð2 283 Þ multiplier is crucial as it is the building block upon which most of the other arithmetic operations are based. The area of the MSB multiplier (mult_msb) is 0:024 mm 2 , it has a latency of 2:32 s and consumes 3:94 nJ of energy. The area of the LSB multiplier (mult_lsb1) is 0:022 mm 2 , it has a latency of 2:31 s and consumes 4.46 nJ of energy. Therefore, this multiplier has 11 percent less area and uses 13 percent more energy than the MSB multiplier. Using the AET metric, it can be seen that the differences between the two approaches is less than one percent. From an analysis of the multipliers presented in Table 2 , where mult_lsb2 represents the search for the two LSB being zero, etc., it can be seen that mult_lsb3 has the lowest AET figure. This is the multiplier that is used in this work.
Results
It can be noted that the Karatsuba algorithm multiplier has a latency of 1:93 s, which is comparable to the LSB multiplier due to its parallel architecture. Also the results for the squaring and sqroot circuit are of the same order.
The inverter based on Fermat's little theorem (inv_ferm) is 0:044 mm 2 . It uses 68:1 nJ of energy and require 22:65 s to run to completion. From Table 2 , it can be seen that the area of the Extended Euclidean inverter (euclid) is 43 percent greater. It is also an order of magnitude slower and uses two magnitudes more of energy. Thus, by all the metrics used to evaluate designs in this paper, the inverter based on Fermat's little theorem is the preferred choice for inversion in GF ð2 283 Þ.
TATE PAIRING ACCELERATOR ARCHITECTURE
In this section, the arithmetic units presented previously are incorporated into a Tate pairing hardware accelerator. A top-level block diagram of the architecture of our proposed accelerator is given in Fig. 6 . The device is connected with the host using the Advanced Peripheral Bus (APB) scheme. The Host Interface block interfaces with the APB. It is responsible for decoding the write data input signal and address signal to write to the internal registers. The read data output is muxed in this block with the control, status, and resultant data from the Tate pairing accelerator. These internal buses are gated when not in use to conserve energy. The control and status register block is used to implement the control register, status register, and the read and write data pointers. Accessing the data registers in this block has the effect of updating the write or read pointers, which are implemented as six-bit counters. Writes and reads to the data registers are in fact writes and read to registers in the Tate block.
There are two clock domains in the design; the APB clock which is PCLK and runs at 50 MHz and a system clock, tate_clk, which runs at 200 MHz. These clocks are assumed to be asynchronous. Signals that cross the clock boundary will require synchronization and this is achieved in the synchronization block.
Finally, the Tate block implements the algorithm for calculating the Tate pairing using Algorithm 1. Two points on the curve are required to calculate the Tate pairing and these will have coordinates in GF ð2 283 Þ. Therefore, four 283-bit values have to be written into the device before the Tate block can be initiated. When it is finished it sends an interrupt back to the host interface (tate_intr). 
Data Path
The data path is presented in Fig. 7 . The databus is 283 Â 4 bits wide. The tate_in register is arranged in 5 Â 283 bit registers that can be written to in 32-bit or 283-bit mode. When the elliptic curve points are written into the accelerator they are accessed in 32-bit mode by the processor via the host interface block. When the operation is finished a "done" signal is asserted which is assigned to an interrupt. Upon detection of this interrupt, the processor can read the output data, 32 bits at a time, from the tate_out register via reads to the tate_data_out register. The zw_alu Arithmetic logic Unit (ALU) calculates z ¼ x p þ x q and w ¼ z þ x p x q þ y p þ y q þ 1. Internally, it has two squaring and square root circuits instantiated. First, it is used to calculate x p ¼ x 2 p and y p ¼ y 2 p . The tate_alu ALU then calculates x p x q . Then, z and w can be arrived at. As well as the above operations, this ALU also calculates x q ¼ x 283 Þ and is also responsible for all other arithmetic operations required by the algorithm such as; multiplication, inversion, and exponentiation-all in GF ð2 283Â4 Þ. As was discussed above, the inversion circuit in GF ð2 283Â4 Þ requires an inverter in GF ð2 283 Þ and this is implemented in this ALU.
There are two subcircuits implemented in the tate_alu; one for calculating exponentiation and the other for multiplication in both fields and inversion in GF ð2 283 Þ. This last circuit is based upon the Karatsuba algorithm multiplier but with the modification that one of the GF ð2 283 Þ multipliers is replaced by a module that performs inversion and multiplication in GF ð2 283 Þ. The data path is controlled by a finite-state machine (FSM) with 19 states. The data are written into the Tate block by a write to the tate_load bit in the control register, while at the same time, data are written to the tate_data_in register. A write to the tate_start bit in the control register initiates the FSM. It executes 283 loops of the main body of the algorithm and this is controlled by a counter. When the FSM is finished then the tate_done signal is asserted and this is recorded in the status register and sent to the processor as an interrupt.
Experimental Results
The design was implemented using VHDL to be incorporated in an Application-Specific Integrated Circuit (ASIC). The target technology is a Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC) 65 nm low-power CMOS process [42] . Worst-case operating conditions are used and these are; voltage 1:08 V , process 1.000, and temperature 125 C. It is synthesized for a clock of frequency of 200 MHz. Synthesis and physical synthesis is performed using Synopsys Design Compiler and Physical Compiler, respectively [43] . Synopsys PrimePower is used to arrive at a figure for the power consumption of the circuit. Clock power was not included in this figure. Results for the Tate pairing accelerator are shown in Table 3 . From this, it can be seen that it has a latency of 0:7 ms, an area of 0:574 mm 2 , and consumes 29;600 nJ.
DISCUSSION
In terms of the overall system, the inclusion of a hardware accelerator for the Tate pairing will lead to a 79 percent reduction in latency and energy when compared with running the scheme in software. Even with this improvement in performance, it is evident, with the scheme still taking 91:7 ms and consuming 7:3 mJ, that these percentage drops are not enough to justify the deployment of IBC in a WSN. Further significant improvements can be attained if the power operation (g r ) and the mult operation (rP ) were also accelerated. Assuming that the same reductions in latency and energy consumption can be attained as for the Tate pairing calculation, then the figures are as in Table 4 .
As the time for running the scheme is now 1:75 ms and it consumes 0:08 mJ of energy, then it is probable that the latency and energy figures for the scheme would be in appropriate range for a WSN.
There are several groups which have implemented the Tate pairing in hardware but are targeting the latency metric and also Field Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGAs) rather than energy and an ASIC, therefore these contributions are not a valid comparison with this work [44] , [45] , [46] , [47] . The recent work of Szczechowiak el al. has the lowest reported energy figure for a software implementation of the Tate pairing which is 3:76 mJ for the Imote2 [10] . This is, as would be expected, several magnitudes higher than what is achieved by implementing the pairing in hardware, and too high for the limited energy available to a node.
CONCLUSION
In this paper, we presented a solution for distributing symmetric keys and network access control in a WSN using IBC. The proposed scheme was evaluated against well-known attacks on a WSN and found to perform well. It was then profiled in software, and the most computationally demanding component of the scheme, the Tate pairing, was ported to hardware. We presented our hardware design for the Tate pairing and evaluated it against key metrics. Experimental results indicate that while this work represents significant progress in terms of implementing security in a WSN, further work is needed in order to implement other components of the scheme such as the elliptic curve point multiplication and exponentiation in the field GF ð2 283Â4 Þ.
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